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Abstract
Abel (2002) proposes a resolution of the riskfree rate and the equity
premium puzzles by considering pessimism and doubt. Pessimism is char-
acterized by subjective probabilistic beliefs about asset returns that are
stochastically dominated by the objective distribution of these returns.
The subjective distribution is characterized by doubt if it is a mean-
preserving spread of the objective distribution. This note offers a decision
theoretic foundation of Abel’s ad-hoc definitions of pessimism and doubt
under the assumption that individuals exhibit ambiguity attitudes in the
sense of Schmeidler (1989). In particular, we show that the behavior of
a representative agent, who resolves her uncertainty with respect to the
true distribution of asset returns in a pessimistic way, is the equivalent to
pessimism in Abel’s sense. Furthermore, a representative agent, who takes
into account pessimistic as well as optimistic considerations, may result in
the equivalent to doubt in Abel’s sense.
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1 Introduction
Abel (2002) convincingly argues that the assumption of pessimism and doubt
may both help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle (Weil, 1989) and the equity pre-
mium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). By dropping the rational expectations
assumption, Abel defines a pessimist as a decision maker whose subjective prob-
abilistic belief about asset returns is stochastically dominated by the objective
distribution of these returns. Accordingly, a decision maker is characterized by
doubt if her subjective probabilistic belief about asset returns represents a mean-
preserving spread of the objective distribution. As a shortcoming of his approach,
Abel does not provide any further explanation why individuals might systemati-
cally commit such a specific violation of the rational expectations assumption.
The present note offers a decision-theoretic rationale for the occurrence of de-
cision making that can be formally described as pessimism or doubt in the sense
of Abel. Key to our approach is the assumption that individuals may exhibit
ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler (1989) and who may thus, for ex-
ample, commit the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). Following Schmeidler, we
formalize such individuals as CEU (=Choquet Expected Utility) decision makers,
that is, they maximize expected utility with respect to non-additive beliefs. Prop-
erties of non-additive beliefs are used in the literature for formal definitions of,
e.g., ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler, 1987; Epstein, 1999; Ghi-
rardato and Marinacchi, 2002), pessimism and optimism (Eichberger and Kelsey,
1999; Wakker, 2001; Chateauneuf et al., 2004), as well as sensitivity to changes
in likelihood (Wakker, 2004).
Our approach focuses on non-additive beliefs that are defined as neo-additive
capacities1 in the sense of Chateauneuf et al. (2004). Neo-additive capacities
are non-additive beliefs that stand for marginal deviations from additive beliefs
such that uncertainty is resolved by a combination of pessimistic and optimistic
attitudes. In particular, a neo-additive capacity is characterized by a parameter
δ (degree of ambiguity) which measures the lack of confidence the decision maker
has in some additive probability distribution pi. Moreover, the ambiguous part of
a decision maker’s belief puts some weight (measured by the degree of optimism
λ) on the best consequence as well as some weight (measured by the degree of
pessimism γ = 1− λ) on the worst consequence possible.
In the context of Abel’s model, we interpret this additive probability dis-
tribution pi as the representative agent’s estimator for the underlying objective
probability process of asset returns. Under the rational expectations paradigm
the estimator pi must, first, coincide with the ”true” probability distribution and,
second, the individual must not be ambiguous about her subjective belief, i.e.,
δ = 0. Analogously to the rational expectations approach, we assume that pi is
indeed the correct estimator for the ”true” probability distribution. However, our
1”neo” stands here for ”non-linear on extreme outcomes”.
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approach deviates from the rational expectations paradigm since we allow for the
possibility that the decision maker is not entirely certain about whether her es-
timator pi coincides with the ”true” probability distribution. Hence, δ > 0 might
be possible. The predominantly pessimistic (optimistic) CEU decision maker of
our model then resolves this lack of confidence in her estimator pi in a pessimistic
(optimistic) way by putting additional decision-weight on the possibility that the
worst (best) consequence realizes for which γ = 1 (λ = 1).
Since the assumption of CEU decision makers with purely pessimistic be-
liefs successfully accommodates widely observed paradoxes of the Ellsberg type,
our results support the presumption that real-life individuals can be formally
described as pessimistic decision makers in the model of Abel. Even more rele-
vantly,our decision theoretic foundation of Abel’s assumption of doubt is related
to recent empirical evidence showing that real-life decision makers take into ac-
count optimistic as well as pessimistic considerations (Kilka and Weber, 2001;
Abdellaoui et al., 2004; Wakker, 2004).
Chen and Epstein (2002) also critically discuss Abel’s ad hoc assumptions and
propose instead to consider ambiguity averse decision makers defined according to
the multiple-priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). While our motivation
is similar to Chen and Epstein, our approach differs in two important respects.
First, while the multiple-priors approach can be used to equivalently describe
pessimistic decision behavior in the sense of Abel, it cannot provide a formal
equivalent for Abel’s notion of doubt since the multiple-priors model neglects any
optimistic considerations in the case of ambiguity. Second, our assumption of neo-
additive capacities where the subjective estimator pi just coincides with the true
probability distribution represents only a slight - though in our opinion compelling
- interpretational deviation from the rational expectations assumption.
The remainder of this note proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader
to Choquet expected utility theory with a strong focus on neo-additive capacities.
In Section 3 we demonstrate that a CEU decision maker with purely pessimistic
beliefs can equivalently be formalized as a pessimist in the sense of Able. We
also show that CEU decision making which takes into account optimistic as well
as pessimistic considerations is the analogue to doubt in Abel’s sense.
2 Choquet Expected Utility Theory and Neo-
Additive Capacities
As a proposal for accommodating the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), CEU
theory was first axiomatized by Schmeidler (1986, 1989) for the framework of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) who assume the existence of random devices, gen-
erating objective probabilities. Subsequently, Gilboa (1987) as well as Sarin and
Wakker (1992) have presented CEU axiomatizations for the Savage (1954) frame-
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work - where probabilities are derived from betting behavior as an exclusively
personalistic concept - whereby Sarin and Wakker (1992) additionally assume
the existence of ambiguous versus unambiguous events. CEU theory is equiva-
lent to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker and
Tversky, 1993) restricted to the domain of gains (compare Tversky and Wakker,
1995). Moreover, as a representation of preferences over lotteries CEU theory co-
incides with rank dependent utility theory as introduced by Quiggin (1981, 1982),
which is used to accommodate Allais-paradoxes (Allais, 1954).
Adopting the Anscombe-Aumann framework, we presume that the set of con-
sequences, X, is some set of lotteries (=objective probability distributions). An
act, f , is then a mapping from the set of states of the world into some set of conse-
quences, i.e., f : S → X. Given that preferences over acts satisfy the Schmeidler
axioms, such preferences are representable by utility numbers that result from
(Choquet-) integration of vonNeumann-Morgenstern utility indices u : X → R
with respect to some capacity. A capacity (non-additive belief), ν, on the state
space S is a real-valued set function on the subsets of S which satisfies
(i) ν (∅) = 0, ν (S) = 1
(ii) A ⊂ B ⇒ ν (A) ≤ ν (B)
For A ⊂ S let u (f (A)) := u (f (s)) if u (f (s)) = u (f (s′)) for all s, s′ ∈ A.
For a given act f denote by A1, ..., Am the partition of S such that u (f (A1)) >
... > u (f (Am)). Define
w (Ai) := [ν (A1 ∪ ... ∪ Ai)− ν (A1 ∪ ... ∪ Ai−1)] , (1)
where we apply the convention that ν (A1 ∪ ... ∪ A0) = 0. Recall the definition
of Choquet integration:
Definition 1: The Choquet expected utility of an act f with respect to capacity
ν is defined by
CEU (f, ν) :=
m∑
i=1
u (f (Ai)) · w (Ai) (2)
Definition 2 (Chateauneuf et al., 2004): Neo-additive capacities
A neo-additive capacity ν is defined as a linear combination of (i) an addi-
tive belief pi, (ii) a non-additive belief ωp (where only the universal event
S is considered as relevant), and (iii) a non-additive belief ωo (where only
the null event ∅ is considered as irrelevant). Formally:
ν (A) := (1− δ) · pi (A) + δ (λ · ωo (A)) + γ · ωp (A)))
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with δ ∈ (0, 1], λ, γ ∈ [0, 1] such that λ+ γ = 1, and
ωo (A) = 1 if A 6= ∅
ωo (A) = 0 if A = ∅
ωp (A) = 0 if A ⊂ S
ωp (A) = 1 if A = S
The CEU of an act f with respect to a neo-additive capacity ν is given by:
CEU (f, ν) = (1− δ) ·
m∑
i=1
pi (Ai) · u (f (Ai))
+δ ·
(
λ ·max
s∈S
u (f (s)) + γ ·min
s∈S
u (f (s))
)
.
We refer to the parameter δ as the decision maker’s degree of ambiguity since
it has a straightforward interpretation as a measure of how confidently the indi-
vidual believes that the additive measure pi indeed reflects the true probability
distribution of an underlying random process. The individual’s ambiguity about
the additive measure pi is then resolved for neo-additive capacities by focussing
on the extreme outcomes maxs∈S u (f (s)) and mins∈S u (f (s)). How much an
ambiguous individual cares about the best (worst) outcome possible for a cho-
sen act is determined by her degree of optimism λ ∈ [0, 1] (degree of pessimism
γ ∈ [0, 1]). For example, if γ = 1 (λ = 1) we speak of a purely pessimistic (opti-
mistic) decision maker since her ambiguity about the true probability leads her
to particularly focus on the worst (best) consequence associated with her possible
choices.
Remark. Notice that purely optimistic (λ = 1), respectively pessismistic
(γ = 1), neo-additive capacities are concave, respectively convex, capacities. CEU
decision makers with optimistic, respectively pessismistic, beliefs are therefore
ambiguity prone, respectively averse, in the sense of Schmeidler’s (1989) defini-
tion of ambiguity attitudes. As a consequence, CEU decision makers with purely
pessimistic neo-additive capacities may commit the two-urn paradox as described
in Ellsberg (1961), which violates the assumption that individuals actually de-
cide under uncertainty as if they assigned some additive probability measure to
events. More recent investigations (Kilka and Weber, 2004; Abdellaoui et al.,
2004; Wakker, 2004) suggest that, besides expressing ambiguity aversion, most
decision makers overweight the relevance of rather unlikely events so that a cor-
responding probability weighting function would be inversely S-shaped. Such
a decision behavior can be well captured by CEU with respect to neo-additive
capacities such that 0 < γ, λ and λ ≤ γ.
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3 A Decision Theoretic Foundation of Abel’s
Pessimism and Doubt
The representative individual of Abel’s (2002) model (cf. also Lucas, 1978) holds
some asset which produces returns r = lnR ∈ R according to some objectively
given probability distribution pi. r denotes the net rate of return and R the gross
rate of return of the underlying asset. Suppose that this asset may produce m
different returns, so that we can assume some finite partition A1, ..., Am of the
state space S whereby greater indices of the events indicate lower returns, i.e.,
r (Aj) > r (Aj+1) for j ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}.
In his proposal for a resolution of the riskfree-rate and the equity premium puz-
zles, Abel exploits the difference between the expected utility of the asset-returns
with respect to the objective probability distribution,
∑k
i=1 u (Ai)·pi (Ai), and the
according expected utility of the asset-returns with respect to some subjective
probability distribution pi∗, i.e.,
∑k
i=1 u (Ai) · pi∗ (Ai). Abel defines a pessimist as
follows:
Definition 3 (Abel, 2002): A decision maker is a pessimist in the sense of Abel,
if and only if, her subjective probability distribution pi∗ over asset-returns
is (strictly) first-order stochastically dominated by the objective probability
distribution pi, i.e., for all k ∈ {1, ...,m},
k∑
i=1
pi∗ (Ai) ≤
k∑
i=1
pi (Ai)
and for some k ∈ {1, ...,m},
k∑
i=1
pi∗ (Ai) <
k∑
i=1
pi (Ai)
Doubt in the sense of Abel is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Abel, 2002): A decision maker is an individual with doubt in the
sense of Abel, if and only if, her subjective probability distribution pi∗ over
asset-returns represents a mean-preserving spread of the objective probability
distribution pi ,i.e.,
E∗(r) =
k∑
i=1
pi∗ (Ai) · r(Ai) =
m∑
i=1
pi (Ai) · r(Ai) = E(r)
and
var∗(r) = E∗(r − E∗(r))2 > E(r − E(r))2 = var(r)
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Observe that the only relevant act in Abel’s model is holding the asset, so
that a CEU decision maker with non-additive belief ν evaluates the asset as∑k
i=1 u (Ai) · w (Ai) where w (Ai) is given by (1).
We now show that our definition of a purely pessimistic CEU decision maker
can be considered as a formal special case of Abel’s definition.
Proposition 1: A representative agent CEU decision maker with neo-additive
capacity ν such that γ = 1 can be equivalently characterized as a pessimist
in the sense of Abel whereby the subjective probability distribution pi∗ is
defined as follows:
pi∗i : = (1− δ) · pi (Ai) for i ∈ {2, ...,m− 1} , and
pi∗m : = (1− δ) · pi (Am) + δ
Proof: Notice that (1) implies for purely pessimistic beliefs, i.e., γ = 1,
wi = (1− δ) · pi (Ai) for i ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}
and
wm = (1− δ) · pi (Am) + δ
whereby the last equation can be equivalently written as
wm = 1− (1− δ) ·
m−1∑
i=1
pi (Ai)
Now define pi∗i := wi for i ∈ {1, ...,m}, so that a CEU decision maker with
neo-additive capacity ν evaluates the asset as if she was an expected utility
maximizer with subjective (additive) belief pi∗. Moreover, observe that
k∑
i=1
pi∗ (Ai) = (1− δ) ·
k∑
i=1
pi (Ai) <
k∑
i=1
pi (Ai) for k ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}
and
m∑
i=1
pi∗ (Ai) =
m∑
i=1
pi (Ai) = 1
Thus, the accordingly defined subjective pessimistic probability distribution pi∗
is (strictly) first-order stochastically dominated by the objective probability dis-
tribution pi. This proves our claim.¤
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We next demonstrate that a CEU decision maker might evaluate the asset
in Abel’s model as if she was an expected utility maximizer with subjective
(additive) belief pi∗ where pi∗ is a mean-preserving spread of the true distribution
pi.
Proposition 2: Consider a representative agent CEU decision maker with neo-
additive capacity ν such that
E (r) = λ · r (A1) + γ · r (Am) (3)
and pi (A1) + pi (Am) < 1. Such a CEU decision maker can be equivalently
characterized as an individual with doubt in the sense of Abel whereby the
subjective probability distribution pi∗ is defined as follows:
pi∗i : = (1− δ) · pi (Ai) for i ∈ {2, ...,m− 1} , and
pi∗1 : = (1− δ) · pi (A1) + δ · λ
pi∗m : = (1− δ) · pi (Am) + δ · γ
Proof: At first notice that assumption (3) entails
E∗(r) =
k∑
i=1
(1− δ) · pi (Ai) · r(Ai) + δ (λ · r(A1) + γ · r(Am))
= (1− δ) · E (r) + δ · E (r) = E(r),
i.e., pi∗ and pi have identical mean. Now turn to the variances:
var∗(r) =
m∑
i=1
(1− δ) · pi (Ai) · [r (Ai)− E (r)]2
+δ · λ · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + δ · γ · [r (Am)− E (r)]2
= (1− δ) · var(r) + δ (λ · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + γ · [r (Am)− E (r)]2)(4)
Since
λ · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + γ · [r (Am)− E (r)]2
> pi (A1) · [r (A1)− E (r)]2 + ...+ pi (Am) · [r (Am)− E (r)]2
= var(r)
whenever assumption (3) holds and pi (A1) + pi (Am) < 1, equation (4) gives the
desired result
var∗(r) > var(r),
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i.e., the subjective probability distribution pi∗ is a mean-preserving spread of pi.¤
Remark. If the distribution of returns is symmetric, i.e., if R is log-normal
and therefore r = lnR is normal as assumed by Abel (2002), then assumption
(3) holds iff λ = γ = 0.5, since, under symmetry, r(A1)− E (r) = E (r)− r(Am).
Remark. The above results are established under the assumption that the
CEU decision maker is the representative agent of the economy. An alternative
way to read our results in Proposition 2 is to assume an economy that is populated
by a proportion λ of purely optimistic decision makers and a proportion γ = 1−λ
of purely pessimistic decision makers. Analogously the parameters δ, λ and γ can
themselves be regarded as averages over heterogenous agents.
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